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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
and
STATE BAR JOURNAL
VOLUME XIII. JANUARY, 1938 NUMBER 1
RECOVERY FOR INJURY WITHOUT IMPACT: THE
WASHINGTON CASES
JOHNx W. RicHADs*
I.
It is fifty years, almost to a day, since the problem of liability
for physical injuries to the plaintiff, caused not by impact but by
fright or shock induced by defendant's negligent conduct, made
its nearly simultaneous appearance in England' and the United
States.' Both the House of Lords and the Supreme Court of New
York disposed of it by denying liability; both stressed the lack
of precedent as the basis for decision.3 Since then, precedents
have come in plenty, and while many of the states still deny an
action,' the majority in which the question has arisen,5 supported
*Professor of Law, University of Washington.
"Victorian Railways Commissioners v. Coultas, 13 A. C. 222 (Feb.,
1888).
2Lehman v. Brooklyn City Ry. Co., 47 Hun. (N. Y.) 355 (Feb., 1889).
3In the Coultas case, the court said: "The learned counsel for the
respondents was unable to produce any decision of the English Courts in
which, on facts such as were proved in this case, damages were recovered
... It is remarkable that no precedent has been cited of an action similar
to the present having -been maintained or even instituted, and their
Lordships decline to establish such a precedent." In the Lehman case,
the opinion is much briefer and relies solely on lack of precedent, the
court saying: "We have been unable to find either principle or authority
for the maintenance of this action and we have been referred to none
by counsel." Neither court was strictly correct in thinking that its case
was one of first impression. In Byrne v. Great Southern & Western Ry.
Co., an unreported Irish case decided by Palles, C. J., on December 5th,
1882, and referred to in Bell v. Great Northern Ry. (1890) L. R. Ir. 26
Q. B. 426, 441, recovery was allowed to the superintendent of the tele-
graph office in Limerick station, who was shocked when a train crashed
through the wall of his office; there was no physical injury to him, but
the shock impaired his health. In Chicago & N. W. R. R. v. Hunerberg,
16 Ill. App. 387 (1885) plaintiff recovered damages for miscarriage suf-
fered when a negligently managed train crashed into her house, though
there was no impact with her person. There are probably other cases
of similar nature, though with a different result; for example, in Trigg
v. St. Louis, K. C. & Nor. R. R., 74 Mo. 147 (1888), recovery was denied
for the physical effects of having been negligently carried beyond a
station, on the ground that the injury was purely mental; -plaintiff suf-
fered a nervous ailment as a result.
'Braun v. Craven, 175 Ill. 401, 51 N. E. 657 (1898); Morse v. Chesa-
peake & Ohio R. R., 117 Ky. 11, 77 S. W. 361 (1903); St. Louis etc. R. R.
v. Bragg, 69 Ark. 402, 64 S. W. 226 (1901); Alexander v. Pacholek, 222
Mich. 157, 192 N. W. 652 (1923); Mitchell v. Rochester R. Co., 151 N. Y.
107, 45 N. E. 354 (1896); Miller v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R., 78 Ohio St
309, 85 N. E. 499 (1908); Ward v. West Jersey & Seashore R. R., 65 N
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by the unanimous opinion of the law writers, 6 permit the plaintiff
to recover. Almost without exception, the plaintiffs have been
women,7 and a large proportion of them pregnant women; the
most usual physical injury has been miscarriage, a result possess-
ing not only more emotional appeal but a more convincing ob-
jectivity to both court and jury than the obscurer (though no less
serious) nervous afflictions which follow in the train of shock.
The case for denial of liability has been stated in ways which
reflect the doctrinal development of the law of negligence during
the period of its most rapid change;8 the increase of technical
proficiency in both law and medicine, the drift of doctrinal fads
and fashions into newer forms, have rendered most of them' in-
adequate. The earlier cases, as has been noted,9 stressed lack of
J. L. 383, 47 AtI. 561 (1900); Spade v. Boston & Lynn R. R., 168 Mass.
285, 47 N. E. 88 (1897); Morris v. Lackawanna R. R., 228 Pa. 198, 77 AtI.
445 (1910).
3Central of Georgia R. R. v. Kimber, 212 Ala. 102, 101 So. 827 (1927);
Clemm v. Atchison T. & S. F. R. R., 126 Kans. 181, 268 Pac. 103 (1928);
Stewart v. Arkansas Southern R. R., 112 La. 764, 36 So. 676 (1904); Green
v. Shoemaker, 111 Md. 69, 73 At. 688 (1909); Purcell v. St. Paul City
R. R., 48 Minn. 134, 50 N. W. 1034 (1892); Hanford v. Omaha etc. R. R.,
113 Neb. 423, 203 N. W. 643 (1925); Chiuchiolo v. Northeastern Wholesale
Tailors, 84 N. L 329, 150 Atl. 540 (1930); Salmi v. Columbia & N. R.
R. R., 75 Ore. 200, 146 Pac. 819 (1915); Kimberly v. Howland, 143 N. C.
398, 55 S. E. 778 (1906); Mack v. South Bound R. M., 52 S. C. 323, 29 S.
E. 905 (1898); Sternhagen v. Kozel, 40 S. D. 396, 167 N. W. 398 (1918);
Memphis St. Ry. v. Bernstein, 137 Tenn. 637, 194 S. W. 902 (1917); Gulf
R. R. v. Hayter, 93 Tex. 239, 54 S. W. 944 (1900); Sundquist v. Madison
St. R. R., 197 Wis. 83, 221 N. W. 392 (1928); Frazee v. Western Dairy
Products Co., 182 Wash. 578, 47 P. (2d) 1037 (1935) ; Lindley v. Knowlton,
179 Cal. 298, 176 Pac. 440 (1918).
OThrockmorton, Damages for Fright, (1921) 34 HABv. L. P. 260; Bohlen,
Right to Recover for Injury Resulting Irom Negligence Without Impact,(1902) 41 Am. L. REG. (N. S.) 141, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF TORTS, 252;
Bohlen and Polikoff, Liability in New York for the Physical Consequences
of Emotional Disturbance, (1932) 32 COL. L. REV. 409; Goodrich, Emo-
tional Disturbance as Legal Damage, (1922) 20 MICH. L. R. 497; Pound,
Interests of Personality, in SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF TORTS (1924)
87, 103 et seq; Wilson, The New York Rule as to Nervous Shock, (1926)
11 CORN. L. Q. 512; Green, "Fright" Cases, (1933) 27 ILL. L. R. 761; Hal-
len, Damages for Physical Injuries Resulting from Fright or Shock,
(1933) 19 VA. L. HL 253; Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance
in the Law of Torts (1936) 49 HRv. L. L 1033.
'This is a reflection of the assumed higher sensitivity of the female
organism, and if, in addition, pregnancy is present, miscarriage seems
unhappily inevitable. Male plaintiffs have, in a few instances, recovered;
but the writer has discovered only one case in which there was no impact
whatsoever: Byrne v. Great Southern & Western R. R., n. 3, supra. The
male organism suffers fewer lasting physical consequences from shock
alone, sympathetic jury response is less likely, and it is probable that a
more robust scepticism exists both with regard to the injury and the
causation factor.
'No attempt is made to duplicate the discussion contained in the
articles cited in n. 6 supra; substantially all the reported cases are cov-
ered in them, and the arguments pro and con examined in detail.
9Supra, n. 3.
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precedent for recovery as deeisive,--a basis for decision swept
away not only by the flood of cases which soon came, but untenable
because a denial of the very process by which the common law has
grown. The quotable statement of Lord Wensleydale in Lynch v.
Knighto went echoing through the books, and supplied the courts
with an additional reason. "Mental pain or anxiety," he said,
"the law cannot value, and does not pretend to redress, when the
unlawful act causes that alone",--a generalization carrying its
own refutation, since instances at once leap to mind, as in slander
and assault, where the jury is permitted to do that very thing.
Yet this statement, strained through the brief of respondent's
counsel and bolstered with citation, furnished the premise for the
famous non sequitur contained in Mitchell v. Rochester R. Co.,11
a case widely quoted as the epitome of those denying recovery.
Mrs. Mitehell was waiting to board a horse car of the defendant
when another of its cars came down the street. As the team drew
near, it turned to the right and came so close to her that she stood
between the horses' heads when they were stopped; she fainted from
fright, and suffered a miscarriage and consequent illness. In affirm-
ing an order granting a nonsuit the court developed the doctrine
that since there can be no recovery for fright, there can be none for
its consequences, in these words: "Assuming that -fright cannot
form: the basis of an action, it is obvious that no recovery can be
had for injuries resulting therefrom. That the result may be
nervous disease, blindness, insanity, or even a miscarriage, in no
way changes the principle. These results merely show that degree
of fright or the extent of the damages. The right of action must
still depend upon the question whether a recovery may be had for
fright. If it can, then an action may be maintained, however
slight the injury. If not, then there can be no recovery, no matter
how grave or serious the consequences. Therefore, the logical
result of the respondent's concession would seem to be, not only
that no recovery can be had for mere fright, but also that none
can be had for injuries which are the direct consequences of it."
The fallacy of the argument is of course obvious :12 the fright is
not the ground of action, but rather the physical injury it brought
about, the fright being merely the causal connection between the.
negligence and the injury; fright cannot form the basis for an
action, since mere transitory mental disturbance is not, in the eye
of the law, any damage, but serious physical injury is damage to
119 H. L. Cas. 577, 598 (1861).
151 N. Y. 107, 45 N. E. 354 (1896).
2it is elaborately exposed in Bohlen, op. cit. supra, n. 6, and in Throck-:
morton, same reference.
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the most jealously guarded of the interests of personality. Where
the physical manifestation of injury was less spectacular than
miscarriage, as for instance nervous prostration, the argument is
more plausible, courts, as in Cleveland etc. Ry. v. Stewart,13 having
a tendency to regard them as mental, not physical, conditions; but
increasing medical knowledge brought with it a recognition that
the minds and nerves of people are as much a part of their physical
equipment as their arms and legs, and the argument is no longer
advanced even in those jurisdictions still denying recovery. 14
A third reason formerly much relied upon in denying recovery,
but fortunately becoming rarer in the cases, is the statement that
the physical consequences of fright are "too remote" to charge
the defendant therewith. In the words of the court in the Mitchell
case, 15 "it cannot properly be said that the plaintiff's miscarriage
was the proximate result of the defendant's negligence. Proximate
damages are such as are the ordinary and natural results of the
negligence charged, and those that are usual and may, therefore,
be expected. It is quite obvious that the plaintiff's injuries do
not fall within the rule as to proximate damages. The injuries
to the plaintiff were plainly the result of an accidental or unusual
combination of circumstances, which could not have been reason-
ably anticipated, and over which the defendant had no control,
and, hence, her damages were too remote to justify a recovery in
this action." The phraseology and the fallacy of the statement
both follow the conventions of the time of its utterance. Foresee-
ability is used as a test of negligence, and as a measure of dam-
ages for its consequence,--a doubling in brass which even in 1896
had been long frowned upon. 16 The negligence formula is even
yet not completely standardized, but it is nevertheless possible to
say with some confidence that substantially all courts today reject
foreseeability as a test of causation. 17 Moreover, taken on its own
"24 Ind. App. 374, 381, 56 N.E. 917 (1900). The court said: " 'Nervous
prostration' is largely a mental, and not a physical, condition."
",Goodrich, op. cit. supra, n. 6, devotes his article to demonstrating
that "mental" and "physical" are the same thing, so far as injury is
concerned. The Washington court in O'Meara v. Russell, 90 Wash. 557,
562, 156 Pac. 550, (1916), quoting from 8 R. C. L. 527, makes the same
general point in these words: "Furthermore, disturbance of the nervous
system due to fright is recognized as a physical rather than a mental
disease."
*8Supra, n. 11.
"Among the first, and certainly the most famous, of the cases so
holding, is Smith v. London & S. W. R. R., L, R. 6 C. P. 14 (1870).
"1THE RESTATEMENT OF ToRTs, § 435, reflects the position: "If the actor's
conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about harm to another, the
fact that the actor neither foresaw nor should have foreseen the extent
of the harm or the manner in which it occurred does not prevent him
from being liable." "We may assume," says Mr. Justice Cardozo in
Palsgraf v. Long Island Ry. Co., 248 N. Y. 339, 162 N. E. 99 (1928), "that
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terms the Mitchell argument is untenable, since miscarriage is
certainly foreseeable when a pregnant woman is subjected to the
shock of imminent peril; if it is suggested that defendant could
not foresee the presence of a pregnant woman, the answer is that
creating a risk of impact is negligent toward any person, and de-
fendant cannot escape liability for injurious consequences because
they were changed in character or intensified in effect because of
individual condition or idiosyncrasy.' Calling the intervening
mental state between risk and injury a superseding cause is scarce-
ly a solution, since an intervening force which is a natural response
to the defendant's original act of negligence does not relieve him
of liability.'9 Finally, the causation solution is not very convinc-
ing when the very courts which use it are willing to allow a re-
covery for the consequences of fright when there is any showing
of impact, however slight,--contact with a seat back,20 dust in the
eyes,21 a trifling collision between vehicles which scarcely damaged
a fender, 2 2-- the impacts themselves causing no physical injury
whatsoever.
The fourth reason for exempting the defendant from liability
in the no-impact cases is of some substance and deserves closer
examination. It is based frankly on expediency, and is thus stated
negligence, not at large or in the abstract, but in relation to the plaintiff,
would entail liability for any and all consequences, however novel or
extraordinary." And see the statement of Beals, J., in Frazee v. Western
Dairy Products, 182 Wash. 578, 47 P. (2d) 1037 (1935), at p. 597: "Appel-
lants were liable for the natural and probable consequences which might
result from the act of negligence committed, and their measure of re-
sponsibility Is not limited by any rule that they should not be held liable
unless it should -be held that they must have reasonably anticipated just
such an injury as that which occurred." The formula In the Frazee case
is somewhat confusing, since "probable consequence" carries the connota-
tion of foreseeability which Is rejected in the latter part of the sentence;
but it Is plain that probability Is to be judged not by what might happen,
but by what did, and if the result is not too extraordinary (See § 433,
ToaTs RESTATEMENT) then it was a probable result.
"See, for example, Purcell v. St. Paul City Ry., 48 Minn. 134, 150 N. W.
1034, 16 L. R A. 203 (1892), where plaintiff suffered a miscarriage as
the result of fear produced by an Imminent collision between the street
car in which she was riding and another: "When an act or omission is
negligence as to any and all passengers, well or Ill, any one injured by
the negligence must be entitled to recover to the full extent of the Injury
so caused, without regard to whether, owing to his previous condition of
health, he Is more or le;s liable to injury."
"Sec. 442, RESTATEmENT Or TonTs. Sec. 436 deals specifically with
the shock problem: "(2) If the actor's conduct is negligent as creating
an unreasonable risk of causing bodily harm to another otherwise than
by subjecting him to fright, shock, or other similar and Immediate emo-
tional disturbances, the fact that such harm results solely from the
internal operation of fright or other emotional disturbance does not
protect the actor from liability."
"Homans v. Boston Elev. Ry. Co., 180 Mass. 456, 62 N. E. 737 (1902).
2"Porter v. D. L. & W. .Co., 73 N. J. L. 405.
"Comstock v. Wilson, 232 App. Div. 720, 247 N. Y. S. 908 (1931).
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in the Mitchell case :23 "If the right of recovery in this class of
cases should be once established, it would naturally result in a
flood of litigation in cases where the injury complained of may
easily be feigned without detection, and where the damages must
rest on mere conjecture and speculation. The difficulty which
often exists in cases of alleged physical injury, in determining
whether they exist, and if so, whether they were caused by the
negligent act of the defendant, would not only be greatly increased,
but a wide field would be opened for fictitious or speculative claims.
To establish such a doctrine would be contrary to principles of
public policy." '24 This is no make-weight argument; no one can
question the propriety of a court deciding against allowing a cause
of action on the basis of administrative policy, a point recognized
by the editors of the Restatement of Torts in a caveat to section
436.11 Yet it is permitted to pass judgment on the reasons offered
in support of that policy, and the quotation above offers three.
First, it is said that permitting recovery would result in a flood
of litigation; assuming a wrong to be redressed, it is scarcely
proper for a court to shun its responsibility because of the extra
labor involved, and moreover the "flood of litigation" has not
materialized,--even with a comparatively large number of courts
allowing recovery for the past thirty years in the injury without
impact cases, such actions are found in totally insignificant num-
bers. In the second place, it is said that fraudulent claims would
be increased. While proof one way or the other is clearly im-
possible, it might be noted that the danger of fraudulent claims
is present in many types of actions and yet has never been a
ground for abolishing them, nor are the usual means of detection,
thought adequate in other situations, lacking in this one. It is to
23Supra, n. 11.
2'An even stronger statement is found in Huston v. Freemansburg,
212 Pa. 548, 61 Atl. 1022 (1905): "In the last half century the ingenuity
of counsel, stimulated by the cupidity of clients and encouraged by the
prejudices of juries, has expanded the action of negligence until it over-
tops all others in frequency and importance, but It is only in the very
end of that period that it has been stretched to the effort to cover so
intangible, so untrustworthy, so illusory and so speculative a cause of
action as mere mental disturbance. It requires but a brief judicial
experience to be convinced of the large proportion of exaggeration and
even of actual fraud in the ordinary action of physical injuries for negli-
gence, and if we opened the door to this new invention the result would
be great danger, if not disaster, to the cause of practical justice."
5Sec. 436 is quoted in n. 19, supra. The caveat reads as follows:
"Caveat to Subsection (2): The Institute expresses no opinion that the
unreliability of testimony necessary to establish the causal connection
between the actor's negligence and the other's illness or bodily harm may
not make it proper for the court of a particular jurisdiction to refuse,
as a matter of administrative policy, to hold the actor liable for harm
to another which was brought about in the manner stated in this Sub-
section."
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avoid this danger that the impact requirement is established, or
that there be some immediate manifestation of shock before re-
covery will be allowed; it is difficult, or at least not usual, to
counterfeit a fainting spell,26 or a fall down an elevator shaft,
27
or flight from the menace of a flying stump."' The third ground
is very similar to the second, being based on the incapacity of the
jury to determine whether the particular claim is fraudulent and
the proper amount of damages to assess. These problems- are real,
but not unique; it is frequently difficult to pick out the meritor-
ious claim, always difficult to properly assess damages where the
interest invaded is not pecuniary in nature, but the first task has
been rendered simpler by improvement in medical technique and
the second presents no elements of confusion which do not exist
in other cases of physical injury. Always assuming some external
manifestation to guarantee the reality of the harm, the problem
is simply the usual one inherent in all cases falling within what
Dean Green calls "the doctrinal network of negligence": 9 was
the defendant negligent toward the plaintiff, was that negligence
the proximate cause of the fright, and, in turn, the physical injury,
what is the extent of that injury in terms of money. The first
question, stated in terms of risk of impact, is common to all cases
involving negligent physical injury, as is the third; if the second
presents unusual difficulty, it is only because the causal factor
is operating internally rather than externally and so can be traced
only through the medium of expert testimony. Yet if the proof,
having cleared the preliminary hurdle of the trial judge, is con-
vincing to the jury, the mere fact that it might not have been is
scarcely a valid argument for refusing to let them hear it at all.
It is true that some cases allowing recovery have touched the limits
of belief,80 but this is not the only segment of the law in which it
-As in the Mitchell case itself.
-'Cohn v. Ansonia Realty Co., 162 App. Div. 791, 148 N. Y. S. 39 (1914).
"O'Meara v. Russell, supra, n. 14.
"Green, op. cit. supra, n. 3 at page 762.
"An example of such a case is Sundquist v. Madison Rys. Co., 197
Wis. 83, 221 N. W. 392 (1928). Plaintiff was sitting in the rear seat of
an automobile which was waiting in a line of cars for a traffic signal
to change when the car in which she was riding was struck from the
rear by a street car operated by defendant. She saw the car approaching
and became hysterical when the crash came. She sustained no physical
injuries. She was quieted with difficulty and taken to a hotel. She was
very nervous and was unable to sleep until an early hour next morning.
Two months and eight days after the accident, while the car was standing
near the curb and out of the path of the street car at Olympia, Wash-
ington, a street car approached and clanged its bell. Plaintiff immedi-
ately became hysterical, later fainted, and that night one side of her
body -became paralyzed. Judgment for the plaintiff, which was affirmed
on appeal, the court stating that the whole problem was one of causa-
tion, which on the evidence was for the jury, whose verdict was sus-
tained by the facts.
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happens nor in it is there less adequate opportunity for control
by the court.
These, then, are the reasons which have been advanced for ex-
empting the defendant from liability for physical injury resulting
from shock without impact; these are the refutations of them. As
has already been noted, it is believed that today the majority of
jurisdictions permit a recovery in such a situation, the case being
recognized as appropriate for the application of the normal negli-
gence formula and as novel only in that the facts show the force
set in motion by the defendant operating through a causal connec-
tion somewhat out of the ordinary. If the defendant's conduct
has created an unreasonable risk of injury to the plaintiff by
impact, or, in the extremely rare case, if his conduct has violated
a duty of care designed to protect the plaintiff from a fright which
involves an unreasonable risk of producing bodily harm,31 if that
conduct can be found to have been a substantial factor in bringing
about a physical injury,3 2 as distinct from a mere transitory emo-
tional disturbance, then recovery is and should be permitted. Even
in those states still denying a recovery, the growing recognition
of the unsatisfactory nature of the reasons for the result and the
eagerness with which the courts seize upon the slightest impact or
other circumstance to justify recovery lead to the belief that the
view permitting it will ultimately be universal.
II.
The history of the action in Washington is brief. It was not
until 1916, when O'Meara v. Russell33 was decided, that the problem
was presented to the court; even then, it came on a state of facts
so clearly presenting alternative bases for relief as to make the
decision sustaining judgment for the plaintiff authority either for
a perfectly well established doctrine or for a recovery for injury
without impact, and accordingly satisfactory authority for neither.
The facts were these: the plaintiff was standing inside her house
near the door, located a hundred and fifty feet from where the
defendant set off a charge of stumping powder under a stump.
The stump was blown through the air and struck the plaintiff's
house at the eaves a few feet above her head and to one side; she
saw it coming, and was so frightened as not to know what occurred
thereafter until she found herself at the home of a neighbor four
blocks away. What evidently did occur was that she ran from the
scene of her fright. "The evidence tends to show that she was
injured internally, either from the shock or in attempting to escape
3"This situation is covered in the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, § 436 (1).
"The form of statement is that used in the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS. See
§ 431.
"90 Wash. 557, 156 Pac. 550 (1916).
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from the house after the stump had hit the house" ;4 it appeared
that she had been operated on for gall stones and the removal of a
tumor about ten months before the accident, and when she came
to herself in the home of her neighbor she felt severe pain inter-
nally and thought that the incisions for the operations had been
opened. As a result she lost weight and health, and there were
symptoms of permanent internal injury.
It is clear, as the court points out on page 563 of the opinion,
that the injury suffered by the plaintiff was physical and not
"psychological or mental"; hence the rule of Corcoran v. Postal
Telegraph-Cable CO." denying recovery for negligently causing
mental suffering (by the non-delivery of a telegram reporting the
serious illness of a child) would not .apply,86 nor, since the injury
here was the result of negligent rather than intentional conduct,
would that of Winston v. Terrace,7 in which recovery was permit-
ted for illness resulting from the willful and armed invasion of
the plaintiff's home. What rule, then, should apply? After
quoting liberally from American & English Encyclopedia of Law"8
and Ruling Case Law 9 text supporting recovery for physical in-
jury resulting from fright without impact, the court concludes
"that this is the more reasonable rule to be applied in the case
now in hand", 4°--a clear statement, taken in connection with the
quoted material, of the position the court is about to adopt in de-
ciding the case. Yet when the moment comes for applying the rule
to the particular facts before the court, Judge Mount begins his
paragraph by approving one rule and ends it by applying another.
He says,41 after noting that there was no physical impact of the
stump against the person of Mrs. 0'Meara, that all the authorities
would grant a recovery if it had touched her, and "the mere fact
that it did not touch her seems not a sufficient reason for holding
that the results which follow may not be recovered for . . . It
did not strike her; but it struck the house a few feet above her
head. That she was frightened there can beno doubt. She was
clearly justified in attempting to escape from the peril which then
confronted her. And if, in attempting to escape, even by leaving
the house, or running up a hill, which she did, injuries were caused
to her person thereby, it seems upon reason as well as upon au-
thority, that she would be entitled to recover for the injuries
"At p. 558.
= 80 Wash. 570, 142 Pac. 29, L. R. A. 1915 D 552 (1914).
31As the opinion points out at p. 560.3178 Wash. 146, 136 Pac. 673 (1914).
318 Am. & ExG. ENCY. LAw (2d ed.) 665.
"8 R. C. L. 525, 527.
"At p. 562.
"At p. 563.
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naturally resulting from that fright."
This was no bold plunge into the troubled waters of the injury
without impact controversy, to a discussion of which two pages
of the opinion had been devoted; it was simply the application, in
slightly confused form, of a rule well recognized and consistently
applied since at least 1817,42 to the effect that where the defend-
ant's negligence has put the plaintiff in a position of peril, the de-
fendant is liable for physical injuries resulting from the plaintiff's
efforts to escape therefrom.43 The efforts must not be unreason-
able,-in the words of Judge Mount, the attempt to escape must
be "justified"-but the presence or absence of impact is of no con-
sequence. 4  Nor has the plaintiff's fright been a complicating
factor, presumably because it has operated quite openly as a spur
to physical activity, rather than darkly and mysteriously within
the organism; even those courts which are most adamant against
recovery in the true no-impact case have permitted recovery with-
out question under this rule.4" It is not suggested that the result
of the O'Meara case is wrong, or that the rule stated by Judge
Mount was not properly applied, but simply that the injury with-
out impact rule was not used although the facts presented a situa-
tion for its application; hence the decision, while indicating the
court's predilection for the rule, was not an authoritative exposi-
tion of it.
The next case of physical injury caused by defendant's negli-
gence operating through the plaintiff's emotions presented an
entirely different sort of situation. In Kneass v. Cremation Society
of Washington8 there was no threat of bodily harm through risk
of impact; instead, defendant negligently lost the ashes of the
"'Jones v. Boyce, 1 Stark. 402 (1817); plaintiff, an outside coach
passenger, frightened by defendant's negligent driving, jumped off and
broke his leg in an attempt, as he thought, to save himself.
"See Stokes v. Saltonstall, 13 Pet. 181, 10 L. Ed. 115 (1839); Tuttle
v. Atlantic City R. Co., 66 N. J. L. 327, 49 Atl. 450, 54 L. R. A. 582, 88 Am.
St. 491 (1901); Atlantic Coast Line R. v. Daniels, 8 Ga. App. 775, 70 S.
E. 203 (1911); Fahy v. Director General, 235 Mass. 510, 126 N. E. 784
(1920); Twomley v. Cen. Park, N. Etc. Co., 69 N. Y. 158, 25 Am. Rep. 162
(1877); Quigley v. Delaware & H. Canal Co., 142 Pa. 388, 21 Atl. 827, 24
Am. St. 504 (1891); Vallo v. United States Exp. Co., 147 Pa. 404, 23
AtI. 594 (1892). And see § 444, RESTATEMIENT OF TORTS.
"Impact, that is to say, by the force whose creation made the defend-
ant negligent. An internal injury caused by the effort of running would,
for example, satisfy the court as well as the fact that plaintiff fell down
and injured her knee in attempting to escape, as in Tuttle v. Atlantic
C. R., supra, n. 43. The true no-impact situation, the form in which it
has presented the most difficulty to the courts, the form in which the
earlier discussion in the O'Meara case seems to approve it, involves in-
jury through the internal operation of fright alone.
OFor example, the Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, and Penn-
sylvania cases cited supra, n. 43.
"-103 Wash. 521, 175 Pac. 172 (1918).
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plaintiff's diseased child which it was keeping until called for
after the cremation, the result being, according to the plaintiff's
complaint, that they "have suffered great distress of mind, worry,
and mental agony, and their rest and peace of mind has been
almost wholly broken up and destroyed in so much that the physi-
cal health and welfare of plaintiffs has been seriously impaired
and threatened." While the facts as stated in the report are not
particularly appealing,47 the jury awarded damages of $300; the
judgment was reversed in the Supreme Court, Judge Mount writ-
ing the opinion. It is of interest chiefly because of the basis chosen
for distinguishing the O'Meara ease, urged by the respondents as
supporting the recovery. "We are of the opinion," said the
court,4 8 "that the O'Meara case is plainly distinguishable from
this case because the fright and shock caused physical injury at
the time. In the case now before us, there is no allegation that
there was any physical injury ",--a somewhat extraordinary state-
ment in view of the allegations from the complaint set forth
above, and which the court repeated. The opinion continues: "It
is apparent from this allegation that, whatever physical injury
has resulted to the health of the respondents, has been from mental
worry and agony and not from physical injury. In the O'Meara
case, the mental anguish was the result of physical injury at the
time." Therefore, says the court in conclusion, "we are of the
opinion that the rule announced in Corcoran v. Postal Telegraph-
Cable Co.49 is the rule properly applicable to the facts in this
case, and that, under that rule, there could be no recovery for
mental suffering and anguish by negligence where no physical
injury was inflicted and no pecuniary loss resulted."
Aside from the denial of physical injuryi-which may have been
true in fact, but not, as the court insists, on the basis of the al-
legations-there is a curious reversal, both doctrinal and factual,
of the O'Meara case. It was there pointed dut, as an element
justifying recovery, that the physical injury was the result of
mental anguish; it is now said that not only was Mrs. O'Meara's
mental anguish the result of her physical injury, but that since
the Kneass' physical injury was the result of their mental anguish
"The infant died three days after birth in November, 1913; three
years later, two separate calls were made for the ashes, which could
not be found, and in January, 1917, Mrs. Kneass called on the phone,
to be told that the ashes had disappeared and that no further effort
would .be made to find them. Both lapse of time and the age of the child
at death make the allegations of physical harm as the result of shock
not particularly convincing. Note, however, that they convinced the
trial jury.
"At p. 524.
"Supra, n. 35.
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they cannot recover. Add to this the first reason given for dis-
tinguishing the O'Meara case,-- 'because the fright and shock
caused the injury at the time ",-attempt to see how the injury
in the Kneass case was less coincident with the worry and mental
agony alleged, and the result is not distinction but confusion. It
should be pointed out that the result of the Kneass case is prob-
ably sound, on the ground that the conduct of the Cremation
Society was negligent because involving an unreasonable risk of
invading one of a particular species of interest,-the property
interest of the parents in their child's ashes,-but involved no
realizable risk of invading an interest of another species, that of
personal security, and hence the defendant would not be liable
for the invasion which actually resulted. 0 If it was necessary to
distinguish the 0'Meara case, it could have been done much more
convincingly by pointing out that the rule there applied to only
two situations: (1) where the plaintiff was injured attempting
to escape from a situation of peril created by defendant's negligent
conduct, or (2) where bodily harm was brought about by fright
caused by conduct of the defendant, negligent because of the risk
of impact which it created.
The third case which came before the court is more nearly like
the O'Meara situation, the variants being time and the fact that
here the risk was primarily, if not entirely, to plaintiff's property.
In Cherry v. General Petroleum Corp.,51 defendant, by its agents,
were engaged in excavating next to a building occupied and oper-
ated by the plaintiff as a hotel; the lateral support of the building
was negligently removed or weakened, so that a portion of it was
in danger of sliding into the excavation. Being informed of this
by defendant's servants, and told to "lose no time in getting the
rear rooms vacated," 52 the plaintiff was much alarmed, as a result
of which, coupled with overexertion in moving furniture out of
the threatened portion, she allegedly suffered a nervous breakdown
and permanent injury to her nervous system. It appeared that
her furniture moving activities did not commence until between
two and three hours after she had learned of the danger to the
building, though, it should be noted, while that danger still existed.
The court, possibly overemphasizing this lapse of time as an
5°This basis is suggested by Mr. Justice Cardozo in his opinion in
Palsgraf v. Long Island Ry. Co., 248 N. Y. 339, 162 N. E. 99 (1928):
"There is room for argument that a distinction is to be drawn accord-
ing to the diversity of interests invaded by the act, as where conduct
negligent in that it threatens an invasion of an interest in property
results in an unforeseeable invasion of an interest of another order, as,
e. g., one of bodily security." And see Comment g, § 281, RESTATEMENT
OF TORTs, in which the distinction Is drawn.
6'172 Wash. 688, 21 P. (2d) 520 (1933).
'
2At P. 691.
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element in the causation problem,"3 and without reference to a con-
siderable number of cases permitting recovery in analogous situa-
tions difficult to distinguish,5 4 held as a matter of law that judg-
ment for the plaintiff should be reversed on the grounds that her
acts were too remote, owing to the lapse of time and her deliberate
volition, and moreover were unreasonable, since the situation did
not "justify her in proceeding to extremities'' 55 in overexerting
herself when she could have procured assistance; but our chief
interest in the opinion lies in the court's handling of the O'Meara
case.
The approach to that discussion is through the court's reference
to Ewing v. Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. Ry Co.56: "Respondent, of
course, suffered a severe mental shock because of the manifest
danger to her property resulting from the land slip. She ap-
parently, however, recognizes the rule of law to the effect that a
mental shock resulting from mere negligence can not be made the
basis of an action for damages unless there is some impact or direct
physical invasion of the person, or the injury results from some
93TIme Is certainly one element to be considered, but only one, and a
very unimportant one where it is clear, as here, that the Influence of
defendant's negligence and the peril he has created is still a substantial
factor in the situation. It was not and could not reasonably be con-
tended that the plaintiff moved the furniture for any other purpose than
to save it in the event of a collapse of the building, nor that the danger
of such collapse was not as acute at the time she acted as it was when
she was informed of it. Lapse of time Is admittedly important in de-
termining whether she acted reasonably, but to say, because of it, that
her injury was "too remote" indicates that the causation formula is
being used to describe a result rather than to reach it. As to time as
a factor in causal relation, see Comment h, § 433, RESTATEMENT OF TonTs.
"These are the protection of property cases, in which plaintiff is
Injured attempting to protect his property from a risk to it negligently
created .by defendant. A typical situation is that of Illinois Central R.
Co. v. Siler, 229 Ill. 390, 82 N. E. 362, 15 L. R. A. (wi. s.) 819, 11 Ann.
Cas. 369 (1907): defendant railroad negligently set fire to dry grass
and weeds on plaintiff's intestate's property; plaintiff's intestate, In order
to prevent the fire reaching her house, was raking leaves towards the
fire when her clothing caught fire, burning her so seriously that she died.
No contributory negligence being shown, it was held that defendant
was liable for her death. The result seems sound, and the only basis
for distinguishing the Cherry situation would seem to be the possibly
unreasonable character of the plaintiff's conduct in the latter case, In
overexerting herself instead of getting help; the fact that the intestate
in the Siler case was injured by the very agency whose creation made
the defendant's conduct negligent should make no difference--a strained
ligament or nervous breakdown should do as well. Other similar cases:
Prescott v. Connell, 22 Can. Sup. Ct. 147 (1893); Henry v. Cleveland
C. C. etc. Ry., 67 Fed. 426 (1895); Cooper v. Richland County, 76 S. Car.
202, 56 S. E. 958 (1906); Woodcock v. Hallock, 98 Vt. 284, 127 Atl. 380
(1925). There are, of course, authorities to the contrary.
"At p. 697.
"At p. 695, 696. In the Ewing case, plaintiff was denied recovery for
physical injuries resulting from shock when defendant, negligently oper-
ating Its trains, threw derailed cars into her yard and against her house.
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wilful or wanton act'",--citing the Ewing case. It seems apparent
from the method of statement, that the court "recognizes the rule
of law" thus stated too, and that the stage is set for an explicit
repudiation of the 0'Meara case, but what emerges is a distinction.
Respondent relied heavily on the O'Meara case, but the court dis-
tinguished it from the Cherry situation by saying, after reciting
the familiar facts of the blast, the flying stump, its impact with
the house :17 "This situation constituted an immediate physical
invasion of the plaintiff's personal security, which she could not
avoid, an entirely different situation from that here presented."
It also constituted a source of confusion, for unless there is a dis-
tinction between plaintiff's dwelling being struck by a railroad
car and being struck by a stump, each negligently launched against
the plaintiff by defendant, the O'Meara case and the Ewing case
are exactly alike, yet with diametrically opposed results. The
O'Meara case is clearly accepted, so that either the court did not,
in fact, approve the Ewing doctrine, or it somehow imagined that
the O'Meara case falls within it; the choice of language makes the
latter alternative more plausible, since the difference between "di-
rect physical invasion of the person" in the Ewing rule, and "im-
mediate physical invasion of the plaintiff's personal security" in
the Cherry statement seems largely one of elaboration, unless the
plaintiff can be thought of as wearing her "personal security" as
a sort of extension of her personality, like the aura of the mes-
merists.
Fortunately all doubts were soon dispelled by the last case of
the series presented for discussion, and the Cherry case is im-
portant for our purposes chiefly because it furnished the archetype
for the formula now to be used in injury without impact cases
in Washington. In Frazee v. Western Dairy Products"s the court
was for the first time faced with the problem in its unadulterated
form. Mrs. Frazee, three months pregnant, was seated in her
living room when defendant's dairy truck, left unattended with
the motor running two blocks up the street in violation of a city
ordinance, came backing driverless down the street at a speed of
from eight to ten miles an hour, had a minor collision with a street
car, ran part way up the bank in front of Mrs. Frazee's house, and
tipped over towards the street. Her house was set thirty feet from
the sidewalk on a level yard four feet above the sidewalk level; the
bank on which the truck turned over was just inside the walk. Her
small son was on the front steps, and she feared that not only
would the truck crush him but would also strike the house, burst
57At p. 698.
5182 Wash. 578, 47 P. (2d) 1037 (1935).
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into flames, and set the house on fire. As the truck approached,
she called to a roomer to get her son, but, unlike Mrs. O'Meara, did
not flee; instead, a "tight feeling" came over her, and she sat
frozen with terror in her chair. The fright was followed by head-
ache and nervous symptoms; taken to a hospital a week later, the
unhappily inevitable miscarriage followed in a month. Verdict
and judgment for $7250 were affirmed by the Supreme Court.
The opinion, by Judge Beals, discusses the general problem of
whether there may be a recovery for physical injury without im-
pact in a way leaving nothing to be desired; the Ewing case is
repudiated,59 the O'Meara case explained and approved,60 the
Kneass and Cherry cases distinguished, 61 and on the basis of sparse
but well chosen authority the court definitely takes its stand as
among those allowing a recovery. In its articulation of the form-
ula, however, the result is not quite so happy, perhaps largely as
the result of lack of emphasis as to the relational aspect of negli-
gence and the choice of a method of expression in a sense forced
upon the court by the trial judge's adoption in his instructions of
language used in the Cherry opinion in distinguishing the O'Meara
case.
6 2
The problems here, as was pointed out in the first part of the
article, are the usual ones in every negligence ease; without much
danger of oversimplification, they may be stated as being these:
(1) was the defendant negligent toward the plaintiff; (2) was that
negligence the legal cause of the plaintiff's injury; and (3) what
is the extent of that injury in terms of money. The damage ques-
tion may here be disregarded, but too much emphasis cannot be
placed upon the need for clarity in the formulation of the other
two, particularly in this sort of case. It is vital to see defendant's
negligent conduct not only in terms of risk, but in risk to the
plaintiff, and moreover, if we are to stay within the generally
recognized limits of the ho-impact cases, that risk must be of a
particular type of hazard: it must be a risk of impact. To be
specific, it is not enough that defendant's servant, leaving his truck
with the motor running, was violating a city ordinance, or even
that his conduct created a foreseeable risk to users of the street;
it is essential that it create a foreseeable risk of impact to Mrs.
Frazee, seated in her living room two blocks down the hill in a
house four feet above and thirty feet from the street. In the words
of Mr. Justice Cardozo in Palsgraf v. Long Island Ry.,68 ".if no
"At p. 587.
c*At p. 590.
"At pp. 586, 589.
2172 Wash. at p. 698.
"cSupra, n. 50.
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hazard was apparent to the eye of ordinary vigilance, an act
innocent and harmless, at least to outward seeming, with reference
to her, did not take to itself the quality of a tort because it hap-
pened to be a wrong with reference to some one else." The point
is made by Judge Beals on page 585 of the opinion,-indeed, he
quotes from the Palsgraf case in making it-but it is easy to slide
away from, and less explicit statement, such as "whether the
escape of the truck was due to negligence, whether Mrs. Frazee
was frightened ...",61 and "did appellant's negligence result in
violation of Mrs. Frazee's right to security in her person, family
and home . .,,65 renders the danger of doing it acute.
Once the risk of impact to the plaintiff is established, the de-
fendant's negligence is clear; it remains to be determined whether
that risk in fact caused fright to the plaintiff, and whether that
fright in fact brought about physical injury. "In fact" is stressed,
since presumably there is no room for argument as to whether or
not the fright was reasonable, that having already been decided
when the risk of impact was reasonably foreseen, nor is there need
for other than a factual determination of the causal connection
between fright and injury; no matter how unusual or unforesee-
able the latter may be, liability will follow if cause is established.6
There are no particular keys to the solution of the problem; the
immediacy of the injury may of course make it easier, but the re-
quirement that the injury follow "immediately" upon the shock
is one which the court wisely rejects,67 recognizing the presence
or absence of time lag to be purely fortuitous and of no particular
consequence.
The instructions given and approved on this branch of the case
were as follows :68 "If you find that the situation existing at the
very moment of the upset was such that it constituted an immediate
physical invasion of the personal security of the plaintiff wife,
which she could not avoid, and that the shock, if you find there
was such, to the nerves and nervous system of plaintiff wife was
practically simultaneous with the upset and that her actions were
spontaneous and not the result of deliberation or conscious volition
but were, on the contrary, the natural reactions to the situation,
then plaintiffs are entitled to recover for such injuries as you find
they may have sustained." A neater illustration of both the
utility and the danger of incorporating former pronouncements
of the court into an instruction could scarcely be found,-the
"At p. 587.
"At p. 590.
I'Supra, n. 17.
"At pp. 595, 596.
"At p. 596.
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utility, because only rarely will a court repudiate its own language,
thus preserving the trial court's record against reversals, and the
danger, because such statements, cast in terms to meet the facts
of a specific situation, rarely if ever fit a different one so exactly
as not to be misleading. As a means of distinguishing the Cherry
from the O'Meara case, the observations were, with the exception
already noted, perfectly sound. Descriptively, they were accurate:
Mrs. O'Meara could not avoid the hazard of the stump, the shock
to her nerves was simultaneous with the blast, and her reaction
of flight was spontaneous, not the result of deliberation, and
natural. But it must be recognized that the court, in giving voice
to them, was seeking merely to point out the factual differences
between the two cases, not formulate a rule whereby liability for
injury without impact could be determined. Even if it were
doing so, the result was neither generalized nor accurate enough
to deserve perpetuation. To particularize: the jury is asked to
determine whether the "shock ... to the nerves and nervous sys-
tem of the plaintiff wife was practically simultaneous with the
upset", a reasonable and universally applied requirement which
guards against claims made on the basis of injury resulting from
plaintiff's brooding on remembered perils, or from second-hand
information vividly relayed. But in the next breath, the jury is
asked to find whether "her actions were spontaneous and not the
result of deliberation or conscious volition but were, on the con-
trary, the natural reactions to the situation'",-a request perfectly
meaningless in a case in which the plaintiff, overcome by "a tight
feeling", sat perfectly quiet in her chair, and moreover without
significance in any case unless the escape 9 or protection of pro-
perty7" rules are to be applied and the argument against recovery
is to be either the unreasonable nature of the plaintiff's conduct
or voluntary assumption of risk. Moreover, it has already been
pointed out that whether the reaction was "natural" or not is of
no importance; if it occurred in fact, it must have been natural
in one sense since happening in a state of nature, and if "natural"
in the sense of probable or foreseeable, that is of no consequence
to the defendant's liability.7
Finally, if the first part of the instruction is to be approved
for use in later cases, it is submitted that it should be revised both
as to content and form. The jury is told to bring in a verdict for
plaintiff if, among other things, "you find that the situation exist-
ing at the very moment of the upset was such that it constituted
wgupra, notes 42, 43.
70Supra, n. 54.
"Supra, n. 17.
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
an immediate physical invasion of the personal security of the
plaintiff, which she could not avoid." The importance of the
plaintiff's ability to avoid the "immediate physical invasion" of
her "personal security" is not apparent, save as a rather insub-
stantial aid in determining the reality of the plaintiff's shock; if,
for example, the facts made it clear not only that the plaintiff
could, but also that she knew she could, avoid the threatened im-
pact, we might not be so ready to believe in the actuality of her
alleged shock, feeling that the obvious avenue of escape might
minimize, if not prevent, the sense of fright claimed as the source
of harm. If on the other hand, we were convinced of the fact of
shock, her power of avoiding the threatened impact would be im-
material, except in those cases in which impact actually took place;
then, of course, it would be important on the issue of contributory
negligence. In the second place, the language of the first part of
the instruction is somewhat baffling, a point raised by appellant's
counsel and disposed of by the court in these words :72 "The jury
could not have been misled by the instruction, and the words which
appellants contend should be explained, considered with the other
instructions given, are perfectly plain." While that is undoubt-
edly true, since the other instructions referred to are not available
to us in the report, nor likely to be available to the next trial judge
required to frame a set in a similar situation, a somewhat more
explicit interpretation would have been desirable. The phrase
"immediate physical invasion of the personal security of the plain-
tiff" must mean simply "apparent risk of immediate impact with
the plaintiff ",-admittedly less graceful than the form chosen,
but plain enough to satisfy even an appellant's attorney. If the
paraphrase is accurate, one more point should be noted: the rather
unfortunate choice of the moment at which the existence of ap-
parent risk is to be determined. The instruction used selects "the
situation existing at the very moment of the upset",-the very
moment, that is, when the force set in motion by defendant's negli-
gence comes to rest in a position of safety, the very moment when
any apparent risk to the plaintiff terminates. It may seem a small
matter, but it is suggested that the moment just before the upset is
one of considerably more importance.
The following instruction, incorporating the foregoing sugges-
tions, is offered as being not only more applicable to the facts of
the Frazee case, but as more accurately presenting the essential
elements for a recovery: "If you find that just before the upset
there was an apparent risk of immediate physical impact to the
plaintiff, and that the shock, if you find there was such, to the
"At p. 596.
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nerves of the plaintiff was caused immediately by that apparent
danger and brought about such physical injuries, if any, as you
find that she sustained, then the plaintiff is entitled to recover for
such injuries." Thus stated, the instruction seems simple and
understandable. It should keep recovery well within the doctrinal
limits set by the Washington court. It seems readily adaptable
to any situation within those limits, since the only variant will be
the description of the moment at which the apparent risk is to be
determined. The major problem has already been decided by the
court, with the final authoritative recognition in the Frazee case
that physical injury through fright without impact will give a
cause of action; equipped with a properly articulated formula,
future cases should present only factual difficulties. 8
"Assuming, of course, that they fall within the limits of recovery
set .by the Frazee case, i. e., where the fear or shock is due to plaintiff's
fear for her own safety. It the fear is for the safety of another, difficul-
ties much more acute are presented, as the author hopes to point out on
a later occasion.
